An Empirical Study on the Importance of Psychological Contract Commitment in Information Systems Outsourcing by Kim, Hyung Jin et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
PACIS 2007 Proceedings Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems(PACIS)
2007
An Empirical Study on the Importance of








Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2007
This material is brought to you by the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been
accepted for inclusion in PACIS 2007 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Kim, Hyung Jin; Lee, Sang Hoon; and Lee, Ho Geun, "An Empirical Study on the Importance of Psychological Contract Commitment
in Information Systems Outsourcing" (2007). PACIS 2007 Proceedings. 119.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2007/119
198
111. An Empirical Study on the Importance of Psychological Contract














In IS outsourcing relationship literature, research has focused on detailed legal contracts
and partnerships. We investigate the role of psychological contracts between client and
vendor in the IS outsourcing context. The aim of this paper is to put the concept
“psychological contract commitment” (PCC) under the spotlight, finding out its mediating
effects between legal contracts/partnerships and IS outsourcing success. By analyzing 50
matched survey responses gathered from project managers, vendor firms, and end-users, we
found that psychological contract commitment has both direct and mediating effects on
outsourcing success. Along the same lines, the key findings suggest that psychological
contract commitment explains why legal contracts and partnerships are still crucial to IS
outsourcing success.
Keywords: information systems outsourcing relationship, detailed legal contract, partnership,
psychological contract commitment, outsourcing success
Introduction
In IS (Information Systems) outsourcing, vendors provide clients with services such as data
center operations, system development and maintenance, equipment and network
management, and general management of IS functions (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). Clients
can take advantage of IS outsourcing with low-cost specialized services and opportunities to
focus on focal tasks and resources.
Focusing on relationship management, legal contracts and partnerships are regarded as
representative factors for IS outsourcing success. Although IS outsourcing proponents have
emphasized the importance of managing outsourcing relationships (Kern and Willcocks
2001), few researchers have provided insights into the IS outsourcing relationship between
clients and vendors (Goles and Chin 2002). Furthermore, some studies dealing with this issue
have produced inconclusive results (Kern and Willcocks 2002). Although prior research has
identified legal contracts and partnerships as key success factors for IS outsourcing, there has
been no single practical model that fully explains the dynamics of the IS outsourcing
relationship (Alborz et al. 2003).
Although the focus of much research attention has been more towards detailed legal contracts
and partnerships, recently a new concept, the psychological contract between client and
vendor, has been introduced. Apart from their widely examined economic and legal aspects,
contracts also have a psychological component (Macneil 1980), which is inherently
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perceptual and deals with implicit details and perceived obligations beyond those that can be
explicitly described in formal legal terms (Pavlou and Gefen 2004).
Through the new theoretical lens of the psychological contract, Koh et al. (2004) extended
our understanding of possible factors affecting IS outsourcing success. They applied the
concept of the psychological contract to perceived mutual obligations, and to how fulfillment
of such obligations can predict success. They confirmed the fact that IS outsourcing success
requires careful management of customer-supplier relationships. However, this area of
research is still largely unexplored in the IS outsourcing context.
Our study explains why detailed legal contracts and partnerships are still crucial by
investigating the role of commitment to psychological contracts. Findings from analyzing 50
matched samples of clients and vendors show that PCC(Psychological Contract
Commitment) has a direct impact on IS outsourcing success; in addition, it plays mediating
roles between legal contracts/partnerships and success. Based on the results, we explained the
importance of legal contract and partnership in IS outsourcing from a new perspective. We
examine the role of implicit factors such as PCC in behavior motivation.
Literature Review
Legal contracts, partnerships, and success
Contractual arrangements with vendors are important to the success of an outsourcing
arrangement (Rohde 2004). As in any principal-agent setting, problems arise when the goals
of clients and vendors diverge (Loh and Venkatraman 1995). Without a legal contract, there
is no guarantee that a supplier would not indulge in self-serving behavior. However, legal
contracts are often ineffective as an enforcement mechanism because of the complexity and
ambiguity of the working relationship, which could not be defined explicitly (Henderson
1990). The risk of opportunism is especially pertinent given the extensive and complex range
of details and contingencies for IS outsourcing (Brandon and Halvey 1990).
In addition to legal contracts, partnerships have been proposed as an important factor for IS
outsourcing success. Partnerships can supplement legal contracts in managing the
relationship between client and vendor. As the nature of the outsourcing relationship shifts
from relatively independent to tightly coupled, organizations consider the outsourcing
partnership as a strategic alternative (Lee 2001). The social exchange theory explains why
organizations enter into a closer relationship. The theory assumes that processes evolve over
time as the actors mutually and sequentially demonstrate their trustworthiness (Klepper
1995). DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani (1998) suggest that, when uncertainty is high and a high
level of flexibility is required, the partnership approach is desirable. In a good partnership,
client and vendor share the responsibilities and risk involved with the IS projects, which leads
to success (Grover et al. 1996; Lacity and Hirschheim 1993).
Psychological contract theory
A psychological contract refers to an individual's mental beliefs about his or her mutual
obligations in a contractual relationship (Rousseau 1995). An employment psychological
contract, which is a widespread concept in psychology, refers to employer and employee
expectations of the employment relationship, i.e. mutual obligations, values, expectations and
aspirations that operate over and above the formal contract of employment (Smithson and
Lewis 2003). A psychological contract emerges when one party believes that a promise of
future returns has been made, a contribution has been given, and thus, an obligation has been
created to provide future benefits (Rousseau 1989). Similar to the psychological contract
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between an employer and employee, IS outsourcing involves a contract and a set of mutual
obligations between client and vendor (Ho et al. 2003).
Psychological contract theory offers a highly relevant and sound theoretical lens for studying
IS outsourcing management because of its six distinctive principles: (1) it focuses on mutual
(rather than one-sided) obligations between contractual parties, (2) it’s more comprehensive
than the concept of legal contract, (3) it’s an individual-level construct, (4) it changes over
time, (5) it affects organizational behaviors, and (6) it’s susceptible to organizational factors
(Koh et al. 2004; Rousseau 1996; Coyle-Shapiro 2000).
Mutuality
Psychological contracts deal with mutual obligations. Mutual obligations entail a belief in
what one is obliged to provide based on perceived promises of a reciprocal exchange (Koh et
al. 2004). In the IS outsourcing context, the supplier agrees to make specific contributions to
the customer in return for certain benefits from the customer. Therefore, mutual obligations
are the essence of an IS outsourcing contract. The concept of mutuality highlights the
importance of looking at perceived obligations from the perspectives of both parties involved,
rather than from only one perspective (Koh et al. 2004).
Comprehensiveness: beyond the legal contract
The psychological contract encompasses both parties’ perceptions and beliefs in explicit
written terms, found in the legal contract, and implicit unwritten terms (Rousseau 1995). The
idea of the psychological contract is really a broader concept (Koh et al. 2004). At least a part
of any psychological contract will be interpretation of the legal contract. Expectations in legal
contracts are specified, explicit and defined, while expectations associated with the
psychological contract are unspoken, implicit and imprecise (Levinson 1966). Even when a
legal contract exists, written obligations can never be complete and must be supplemented by
unwritten promises (Macneil 1980). Many times, important terms and conditions are not
explicitly incorporated in the legal contract; contractual parties rely, instead, on the spirit of
the contract as embodied in a handshake (Koh et al. 2004).
Individual-level construct
The psychological contract is an individual-level construct (Koh et al. 2004). Prior research
(i.e. Koh et al. 2004) that applied the concept in the IS outsourcing context provided a unique
and hitherto understudied perspective on outsourcing relationships by focusing on the
individual level of analysis. To avoid individual bias, they elicited information about
psychological obligations through in-depth interviews with project managers. Though
represented at the inter-organizational level, those obligations were actually perceived at the
individual level.
Changeability over time
A number of researchers have noted that the psychological contract is dynamic and that it
naturally changes over time as a result of changing needs and relationships (Smithson and
Lewis, 2003). It can be continually re-negotiated, changing with individual and
organizational expectations. Similarly, in an outsourcing relationship, the psychological
contract between client and vendor is unstable as their expectations change during the project.
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Impact on organizational behavior
A great deal of attention has been given to the aversive consequences of psychological
contract violations on organizational behavior in employment research (Turnley and Feldman
1999). Robinson (1996) reserves the term “psychological contract violation” to refer to the
emotional and affective state, characterized by disappointment and anger, that sometimes
results from the belief that the organization has failed to adequately maintain the
psychological contract and live up to the commitments it made to employees. Psychological
contract violations result in reduced performance on both in-role and extra-role behaviors
(Turnley and Feldman 1999).
Susceptible to organizational factors
Psychological contracts are influenced by factors that define the roles and obligations of each
party. Organizational factors influencing the development of the psychological contract
include organizational policies and practices, which may aid in forming an individual’s belief
in different obligations according to different positions (Guest and Conway 1998). Observing
these policies and practices during the socialization process, s/he perceives the obligations
implied by various positions.
Research Model and Hypotheses
Our interest is in the variable psychological contract commitment (PCC) or commitment to
psychological contracts, which is the extent to which a partner consistently and deeply
concerns with what the counter-party believes as obligations during the duration of the IS
project. The basic premise for the hypothesized relationship between PCC and success is that
for outsourcing success, client and vendor should continually commit to mutual obligations in
which both parties believe, rather than to only superficial explicit obligations (see Figure 1).
PCC is an important variable in IS outsourcing relationships like the one described below.
Figure 1 Conceptual Model
Commitment to psychological contracts can elicit positive evaluation from a counter-party.
Psychological contracts play a pivotal role in evaluating a counter-party because they reflect
what one party really expects from the other. If one party consistently showed high
commitment to psychological contracts, the other party would evaluate it positively. In turn,
positive reciprocation efforts would be increased, which is strongly influential to outsourcing
outcomes (McNeeley and Meglino, 1994). In addition, based on prior research (i.e., Kern and
Willcocks 2002), commitment to the source of benefits leads to active and cooperative
behaviors on the part of outsourcing partners, which go beyond what are defined in legal
contracts.
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The concept of social exchange has been put forward as an explanatory mechanism whereby
one party seeks to reduce indebtedness through reciprocation efforts directed to the source of
the benefits (McNeeley and Meglino, 1994). One act of reciprocation takes the form of
enhanced commitment to the source of the benefit (Coyle-Shapiro 2000). Thus, if the extent
of both parties’ PCC were high, the quality of the relationship could also be good, which
would lead to success in the end. This is because, according to equity theory, each party
continually seeks an equitable balance in the extent of reciprocation (Kickul 2001). Thus, we
expect that
Psychological contract commitment will be positively related to IS outsourcing success.
As implied in the principles of psychological contracts, the content of the legal contract
provides the basis of the psychological contract because each party basically understands the
terms in the legal contract. The psychological contract encompasses the parties’ perceptions
and beliefs in both the explicit written terms found in the legal contract, and unwritten,
implicit terms (Rousseau 1995). If legal contracts specify obligations well, each party better
understands the psychological obligations in which s/he believes.
Contracting is a big negotiation process that requires much effort and cost. Well-defined legal
contracts give a hint of the effective negotiation process that both companies made in order to
diminish the gap between expected obligations. In doing so, both parties better understand the
psychological contract and, taking the next step forward, they recognize their additional
obligations which the other party implicitly expects. This process can naturally lead both
parties to commit to psychological obligations. According to the theory of planned behavior
(TPB), there are three factors influencing a person’s behavior intentions. Of the factors,
subject norm, reflecting the extent to which a person thinks that others want him or her to
perform a behavior (Taylor and Todd 1995), can take place during the in-depth contracting
process in IS outsourcing. Given this, we expect that
Detailed legal contracts will be positively related to psychological contract commitment.
As expressed in the principles of psychological contracts, psychological contracts are
susceptible to organizational factors that form an individual’s belief in mutual obligations and
roles (Turnley and Feldman 1999). In the IS outsourcing literature, the partnership is
regarded as a typical inter-organizational factor for shared goals and benefits between client
and vendor. In addition, similar to partnership, the quality of the working relationship has an
effect on attitudes toward psychological contracts, such as the response to psychological
contract violation and psychological contract commitment (Turnley and Feldman 1999).
When a company enters into a partner-like relationship with others, social information
processing occurs, and norms form concerning appropriate behaviors that conform to the
trust-based relationship (Guest 1998). A good partnership can lead both companies to behave
in the right way, seeking mutual benefits. Along the same lines, a company may show more
interest in what its partner really expects than in a transaction-based relationship. Therefore,
in a good partnership, partners commit more readily to explicit and implicit obligations
because the companies in the partnership behave for their mutual benefits in recompense for
the trust-based behaviors of their partners (Klepper 1995). Given this, we hypothesize that
Partnerships will be positively related to psychological contract commitment.
Any business relationship needs oversight and periodic review (Elliott and Torkko 1996),
particularly of service to client; if this is lacking, it can be destructive to an outsourcing
relationship (Alborz et al. 2003). The response of many organizations to problems with
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vendors is to try to define and specify the contract more rigorously. For many, this has now
become the established principle in outsourcing business as a way of overcoming problems
and has led to an increased focus on contracts and involvement of both internal and external
legal expertise in contract negotiation (Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994).
A complete contract reduces the uncertainty faced by organizational decision-makers and the
risks stemming from opportunism on the part of one or more contracting parties. It provides a
safeguard against ex post performance problems by restraining each party’s ability to pursue
private goals at the expense of common benefits (Gottschalk and Solli-Sther 2005). An
incomplete contract may bring about ambiguity, which creates a breeding ground for shirking
responsibility and shifting blame, raises the likelihood of conflict, and hinders the ability to
coordinate activities, utilize resources, and implement strategies (Luo 2002). Given the
importance of a detailed legal contract, we propose that
Detailed legal contracts will be positively related to IS outsourcing success.
The partnership concept rests on the notion that performance can be significantly improved
through joint, mutually dependent actions (Henderson 1990). Lasher et al. (1991) define the
partnership as "a cooperative relationship in which partners are equally responsible for the
business success or failure of the project or product." Partnership allows two organizations to
achieve key organizational objectives and build competitive advantage in their respective
industries (Grover et al. 1996). Thus, a good partnership with the outsourcing firm is
proposed as the key to success in outsourcing strategy (Livingston 1992). Grover et al. (1996)
showed that the correlation between partnership and outsourcing success is very high. A
strong relationship between partnership and outsourcing success indicates that fostering a
long-term interactive relationship based on trust, communication, satisfaction, and
cooperation is critical to achieving the greatest benefits from outsourcing (Grover et al.
1996). Given this, we anticipate that
A good partnership will be positively related to IS outsourcing success.
Research Method
To assess the above hypotheses within the IS outsourcing context, we conducted a survey.
Preliminary field interviews were conducted with two IT consultants in order to investigate
how they view detailed legal contracts, partnerships, and psychological contracts. The unit of
analysis for this study is the IS outsourcing project, where project teams consist of IS staff
and vendor firm employees.
Measures
We used validated measures to assess the constructs of detailed legal contracts and
partnerships, and measured IS outsourcing success in terms of project and system
performance (see Table 1). Our measures for PCC are based on measures for psychological
contracts of Koh et al. (2004) that first measured the concept in IS outsourcing context, and
modified to add the concept of commitment. Wuytes and Geyskens (2005) introduced the
detailed contract drafting construct which describes the level of detail with which the contract
prescribes roles, responsibilities, expected performance, and how to handle unexpected
events and conflicts. We used the items to measure the concreteness of legal contracts.
Similar to Lee (2001), we define partnership as an interorganizational relationship to achieve
shared goals of client and vendor. The variable partnership has been assessed in terms of
several sub-constructs such as communication, trust, cooperation, satisfaction, business
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understanding, benefit/risk sharing and so on. Based on the definition of partnership, we
adopt four measures, which are repeatedly used and validated in prior research.
Project performance (Karlsen and Gottschalk 2003) refers to criteria for project success in
terms of cost, time, and quality. A successful project should obviously be completed within
the scheduled time and according to the budget. In addition, technical requirements should be
fulfilled. On the other hand, system performance is concerned with the successful
introduction, installation, training, usage, and modification of the new information systems in
a user’s eyes after the outsourced project is complete.
Table 1 Measures and Operationalization of Variables
variables Definitions Measures Sources
Trust
Degree of confidence and
willingness between
Partners
Be open in dealing with partners
Do not make a false claims
Competent in their field
Promises are reliable
























Understand business objectives clearly
Understand business processes clearly
Understand objectives of the information systems

















Degree of articulation and
agreement on benefit and
risk between partners
Actively concern risk and problem occurred during the period
Share benefits of the project
Have collective responsibilities of the project





Degree of legal contracts
describe mutual
obligations in detail
Describes roles of both parties clearly
Describes responsibilities of both parties clearly
Describes obligations of both parties clearly















Care about the obligation of articulating requirements for the
system explicitly
Care about the obligation of paying on time
Care about the obligation of overseeing the project progress
regularly
Care about the obligation of minimizing staff turnover during the
project
Care about the obligation of educating the vendor with industry
and firm-specific knowledge necessary for the project
Care about the obligation of continuously show strong leadership
during the project











Care about the obligation of defining precisely the nature and
range of outsourcing services
Care about the obligation of delineating mutual roles and
responsibilities
Care about the obligation of solving problems independently
Care about the obligation of minimizing staff turnover during the
project
Care about the obligation of educating the client with necessary
skills, knowledge, and expertise about IS
Care about the obligation of building effective inter-
organizational teams with the client
Koh et al., 2004
Project
performance
Project success in terms of
cost, time, and quality
Be completed within the period
Costs are not over the budget
Requirements defined earlier are reflected enough in the outcome
Functions defined earlier are reflected in the outcome
Karlsen and
Gottschalk, 2003;
Dvir et al., 2003
System
performance
Degree of user’s evaluation
in terms of introduction,
installation, training, use,
and modification of IS
IS is used throughout the enterprise
IS meets users’ needs
Minimal start-up problems exist





Data was collected using questionnaires. Organizations which outsourced information
systems in 2004 provided the sampling frame of this study. The list was available in the
periodical White Papers of the IS Market in 2005, published by the Knowledge Research
Group. With 25 clients and 14 vendors, we searched for email addresses of those who were in
charge of outsourcing projects through web pages and the KIS-LINE database. Email
messages and reminder letters containing information about our research project were sent
out several times.
One matched sample consisted of three respondents: a project manager, a project member
from a vendor company with who a project manager cooperated, and an end-user who
actually were using information systems. First, we sent a project manager three types of
questionnaires. Specifically, we asked him/her to answer a type of questionnaires for his/her
own answer. A project manager was also asked to leave the other types of questionnaires
untouched and to deliver them to the other respondents. The other respondents were asked to
answer a certain type of questionnaires respectively and to send responses to the researcher
directly. It was conceived to avoid the evaluation apprehensions. When respondents send to
or receive any questionnaires from each other, they were asked to make an entry of email
address in order to inform the sender or the recipient. By matching the email addresses and
other information included in all types of questionnaires (i.e., project type, project duration,
the time of the project ended) we finally used 50 of 67 matched samples received because 17
sets were not complete.
A project manager answered questions about the DLC (Detailed Legal Contract), partnership,
PCC of vendor, and project performance. A project manager is typically viewed as an
individual representing their organizations and plays a critical role in the assessment of the
outsourcing relationship (Koh et al. 2004). A project member from vendor answered
questions about the PCC of clients. An end-user answered questions about system
performance. As noted above, we asked about the PCC of each party’s counter-party to avoid
response bias.
Results
The objective of the data analysis was to understand the importance of PCC for outsourcing
success in the client-vendor relationship. Based on equity theory, we assume that both
parties’ commitment to the psychological contract is equally important. Therefore, PCC was
calculated by multiplying the PCC values for both client and vendor. The interaction of
variables measured by an actor and a partner can be used to model synergy or reciprocity
(Cook and Kenny, 2005). It highlights the effect of goodness of fit between two variables
instead of each one.
To analyze the data, we utilized the partial least squares (PLS) technique. PLS is considered
especially useful in the early stages of theory testing (Fornell and Bookstein 1982). Given
that (1) our study represents an initial attempt to explore the linkage between DLC /
partnership and PCC, (2) the sample size was small, and (3) our primary emphasis was on
model prediction rather than model fit, the use of PLS was deemed appropriate.
Measurement model analysis
To assess the quality of the measurement model, we conducted several tests of convergent
and discriminant validity, as prescribed by Chin (1998). To assess convergent validity, we
assessed (1) individual item reliability and (2) construct reliability. With respect to item
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reliability, we examined the item-to-construct loadings for all multi-item variables. Although
standardized loadings of 0.7 or greater are needed for the shared variance between each item
and its construct to exceed the error variance, loadings of 0.6 to 0.7 are considered
acceptable, especially if the loadings of other items within the same construct are high (Chin
1998). Most of the items in our study exhibited loadings over 0.7, except TR4, TR5, CO4,
V_PCC3, and SP3 (see Table 2). Given that SP3 had loadings over 0.6 and the remaining
items for the construct had strong loadings (over 0.7), this did not raise too much of a
concern.
Table 1 Factor Loadings and Cross Loadings
TR CO BU SH LC C_PCC V_PCC PP SP
TR1 0.88 0.52 0.59 0.48 0.55 0.58 0.23 0.52 0.61
TR2 0.89 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.48 0.48 0.10 0.49 0.36
TR3 0.88 0.71 0.51 0.71 0.60 0.75 0.15 0.58 0.53
CO1 0.70 0.91 0.45 0.54 0.64 0.67 0.25 0.53 0.50
CO2 0.57 0.88 0.35 0.52 0.61 0.64 0.07 0.49 0.56
CO3 0.59 0.92 0.51 0.58 0.61 0.68 0.24 0.63 0.58
BU1 0.59 0.46 0.96 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.41 0.63 0.42
BU2 0.54 0.25 0.86 0.50 0.34 0.26 0.24 0.45 0.22
BU3 0.57 0.49 0.86 0.52 0.63 0.63 0.35 0.68 0.44
BU4 0.56 0.41 0.92 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.43 0.64 0.47
BU5 0.65 0.56 0.89 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.46 0.65 0.47
SH1 0.60 0.54 0.61 0.93 0.50 0.69 0.13 0.59 0.47
SH2 0.64 0.53 0.55 0.90 0.44 0.61 0.15 0.52 0.50
SH3 0.62 0.47 0.59 0.91 0.50 0.62 0.15 0.45 0.46
SH4 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.92 0.62 0.75 0.20 0.64 0.53
LC1 0.62 0.72 0.57 0.68 0.85 0.81 0.18 0.55 0.52
LC2 0.55 0.63 0.49 0.47 0.80 0.55 0.12 0.44 0.54
LC3 0.46 0.57 0.48 0.45 0.88 0.67 0.26 0.49 0.49
LC4 0.38 0.45 0.44 0.39 0.88 0.65 0.33 0.44 0.58
LC5 0.71 0.51 0.70 0.55 0.78 0.68 0.35 0.51 0.42
LC6 0.42 0.63 0.44 0.35 0.84 0.59 0.02 0.35 0.49
LC7 0.51 0.53 0.66 0.45 0.85 0.77 0.34 0.53 0.46
C_PCC1 0.65 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.76 0.82 0.23 0.52 0.59
C_PCC2 0.53 0.61 0.53 0.68 0.66 0.81 0.35 0.51 0.58
C_PCC4 0.61 0.59 0.51 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.33 0.57 0.56
C_PCC5 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.70 0.88 0.38 0.62 0.57
C_PCC6 0.65 0.69 0.58 0.76 0.62 0.91 0.31 0.66 0.62
V_PCC1 0.05 0.05 0.33 -0.05 0.12 0.05 0.83 0.42 0.03
V_PCC2 0.09 0.11 0.26 0.12 0.14 0.25 0.74 0.46 0.26
V_PCC4 0.14 0.20 0.30 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.73 0.39 0.22
V_PCC5 0.23 0.29 0.40 0.20 0.33 0.42 0.88 0.50 0.27
V_PCC6 0.21 0.17 0.40 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.85 0.50 0.29
PP1 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.34 0.44 0.61 0.47 0.82 0.53
PP2 0.40 0.31 0.55 0.48 0.26 0.31 0.58 0.80 0.39
PP3 0.66 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.59 0.68 0.47 0.92 0.58
PP4 0.60 0.57 0.69 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.44 0.92 0.60
SP1 0.30 0.67 0.25 0.28 0.52 0.57 0.05 0.52 0.67
SP2 0.63 0.50 0.39 0.50 0.41 0.58 0.29 0.56 0.89
SP3 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.07 0.43 0.63
SP4 0.49 0.47 0.28 0.43 0.48 0.56 0.20 0.42 0.90
SP5 0.35 0.34 0.41 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.38 0.46 0.74
Table 2 Reliability and Discriminant Validity
# of items reliability partnership PCC DLC PP SP
partnership 4 0.912 0.850
PCC 5 0.916 0.691 0.829
DLC 7 0.944 0.744 0.700 0.841
PP 4 0.921 0.744 0.723 0.579 0.864
SP 5 0.880 0.641 0.673 0.598 0.622 0.773
* PCC: Psychological Contract Commitment, DLC: Detailed Legal Contract, PP: Project Performance,
SP: System Performance * Diagonal elements display the square root of average variance extracted (AVE)
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Structural model analysis
The next step was to assess whether the second-order construct, partnership, was measured
reliably by the related first-order constructs. Partnership was conceptualized as a second-
order construct measured by fifteen constituent elements of trust, communication, business
understanding, and benefit/risk sharing. The weights of all 15 elements were statistically
significant (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 Second-order Factor Analysis
The next step in testing the hypothesized model was to assess the relationships among various
latent constructs in the PLS structural model. Figure 3 shows the effects for each
hypothesized path, as well as the amount of variance explained (R
2
) for all endogenous
factors. In terms of explanatory power, our model indicates that 55.5 percent of the variance
of PCC was explained by the variables DLC and partnership, 64.3 percent of the variance of
PP was explained by partnership, and PCC. 51.6 percent of SP was explained by only PCC.
The path coefficients are shown Table 4. All of paths except three were significant at the
0.001, 0.01, or 0.05 level. Findings support all hypotheses of the model except H4a, H4b, and
H5b (Figure 3). In sum, the results suggest that PCC of both parties has a significant
association with PP and SP, providing strong support for hypotheses H1a and H1b (=0.445,
p<0.01; =0.404, p<0.05, respectively). The direct impact of DLC on the two success
measures was not significant. In addition, partnership has a direct impact on only PP
(=0.533, p<0.001), suggesting that the cooperative relationship between client and vendor
has limited ability to reflect end-user’s needs for measurement of outsource information
systems.
Next, following Baron and Kenny (1986), we investigated the mediating effect of PCC. Table
5 shows that when the dependent variable is PP, there are significant and positive paths from
DLC to PCC (= 0.417, p < 0.001) and from PCC to PP (=0.445, p< 0.01) indicating a
significant mediating effect. However, the path directly linking DLC to PP turns out to be
insignificant, indicating an insignificant direct effect. Moreover, when the dependent variable
is SP, the mediating effect is significant (= 0.417, p < 0.001; = 0.404, p < 0.05,
respectively); in addition, the direct path from DLC to SP is not significant.
To investigate the mediating effect of PCC between partnership and outsourcing success, we
did the same comparison. Table 6 illustrates that when dependent variable is PP, there are
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significant and positive paths from partnership to PCC (= 0.360, p < 0.001) and from PCC
to PP (=0.445, p< 0.01). However, the path directly linking partnership to PP is also
significant (=0.553, p <0.001); thus, PCC has a partial mediating effect. On the other hand,
when the dependent variable is SP, the mediating effect is (=0.360, p<0.001; = 0.404,
p<0.05, respectively); in addition, the direct path from partnership to SP is not significant.
Figure 3 Structural Model Analysis
Table 3 Hypothesis Testing
From To Beta T-value
H2 DLC PCC 0.417 3.6119 ***
H3 Partnership PCC 0.360 3.3456 ***
R2=0.555
H1a PCC PP 0.445 2.6527 **
H4a DLC PP -0.129 0.7925
H5a Partnership PP 0.533 3.3006 ***
R2=0.643
H1b PCC SP 0.404 2.5570 *
H4b DLC SP 0.103 0.5690




Table 4 Mediating Effect of PCC (between DLC and success)
From To Beta T-value
Direct DLC PP -0.129 0.7925
DLC PCC 0.417 3.6119 ***
Indirect
PCC PP 0.445 2.6527 **
Direct DLC SP 0.103 0.5690
DLC PCC 0.417 3.6119 ***
Indirect
PCC SP 0.404 2.5570 *
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Table 5 Mediating Effect of PCC (between partnership and success)
From To Beta T-value
Direct Partnership PP 0.533 3.3006 ***
Partnership PCC 0.360 3.3456 ***
Indirect
PCC PP 0.445 2.6527 **
Direct Partnership SP 0.285 1.6288
Partnership PCC 0.360 3.3456 ***
Indirect
PCC SP 0.404 2.5570 *
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Conclusion
As the empirical results suggest, our hypotheses were largely supported, indicating the
importance of commitment to psychological contracts (PCC) in the client-vendor
relationship. Overall results indicate that PCC has direct and mediating effects on outsourcing
success. The concept of PCC also allows us to form a new basis of understanding as to why
DLC and partnership are still important variables in outsourcing success.
The importance of legal contract in IS outsourcing can be explained from a new perspective.
Focusing on the risk of opportunistic behaviors, prior research emphasized the tight contract
which described roles and obligations in detail. However, our research illustrates detailed
legal contract has limited ability to affect outsourcing success as organizations enter into a
close relationship. Instead, it provides concrete ground for each party to understand and
commit to obligations in which the other party believes.
Based on the result of our study, partnership has both direct and indirect effects on
outsourcing success. The noteworthy result is that partnership can affect system performance
only through PCC. The extent to which information systems is actually used and/or
assimilated by end-users is very important for the long run (Cronin and Taylor, 1992). In a
good partnership, partners commit more readily to explicit and implicit obligations because
the companies in the partnership behave for their mutual benefits. The potential of
partnership can, therefore, be realized by commitment to psychological contracts of both
parties in IS outsourcing.
Implications
Besides the new understanding of importance of legal contract and partnership, our study
contributes to current and future research regarding implicit factors of relationship
management in IS outsourcing. Research on psychological contracts in the IS outsourcing
context has just begun. Theoretical and empirical topics in this research area should be
continuously pursued. For instance, it will be important for future research to identify other
psychological obligations in which both parties believe. It is also interesting to compare types
of psychological obligations from client and vendor perspectives and to investigate whether
or not the extent of fit between the obligations of the two sides affects outsourcing success.
With future research on these topics, information about outsourcing relationship management
will be more widely available.
For practitioners, the results have also implications. In reality, the process of contract
negotiation is costly and requires expert legal advice (Rohde 2004). Without legal contracts,
being close to partners is risky due to opportunism. In addition, management of partnerships
is not easy work because of its invisibility. Instead, practitioners, through effective
communication or consistent line of behaviors, must continuously commit to what partners
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expect of them in order for both to benefit. Higher level of PCC leads to positive evaluations
and reciprocation efforts from both parties due to the tendency of seeking fairness.
Limitations
Although our research findings have meaningful implications, this study has limitations. Our
results could be influenced by individual differences because we asked only three
respondents per sample, representing these three stakeholder groups: clients, vendors, and
end-users. To reduce possible bias, we asked many questions of project managers, who we
considered to be individuals representing an organization. In addition, our study relies heavily
on cross-sectional data. Because of the changeability of the psychological contract, a
longitudinal design for a psychological contract study could be effective in reducing
common-method variance.
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